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THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS EXPANDS PROTECTED CLASS UNDER SECTION ONE OF
THE FAA TO INCLUDE WORKERS WHO TRANSPORT PASSENGERS: A COMMENT ON SINGH V.
UBER TECHNOLOGY, INC.
By
Patrick Ouellette*
I.

Introduction
Section two of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) “is a congressional declaration
of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.”1 Section two has been the
lens through which arbitration agreements have been viewed since Justice Brennan wrote
it in 1983 in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.2
Consistent with the federal policy favoring arbitration, courts seldom invalidate arbitral
agreements negotiated and agreed upon between two consenting parties. However,
section one of the FAA includes an exemption.3 The exemption states that the FAA does
not apply "to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class
of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."4
The Supreme Court has generally tried limiting the scope of the exemption in an
attempt to limit forum shopping from opportunistic counsel.5 However, the Court has
ruled consistently that the employment contracts of railroad employees and seamen are
exempt from the FAA.6 It is the part of the clause concerning “workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce” that has required the most clarification from courts.7 In
the case that will be discussed in this comment, a driver for the ridesharing company
Uber Technologies, Inc. (Uber) has asked the Third Circuit to find that he is an employee
that is engaged in interstate commerce, and thus his dispute should be exempt from
arbitration under section one of the FAA.8 The Third Circuit reversed a decision by a
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lower court that compelled arbitration, and remanded for a new trial consistent with an
interpretation granting an exemption for employees who transport passengers.9
II.

Case Background
Jaswinder Singh (Singh) was a driver for Uber.10 He brought a putative class
action in the Superior Court of New Jersey on behalf of himself and all those similarly
situated Uber drivers in New Jersey.11 Singh claims that Uber “misclassified” the drivers
as independent contractors instead of employees.12 As a result of the misclassification,
the drivers were deprived of overtime compensation and were forced to incur business
expenses for the benefit of Uber.13
Uber removed the case to the federal district court in New Jersey, and then filed a
motion to dismiss and sought to compel Singh to arbitrate based on the arbitration
agreement Singh had signed when he began working for Uber.14 Singh opposed the
motion to compel arbitration on multiple grounds.15 Singh first argued that no valid
agreement existed between him and Uber at the time that Singh began his employment
with Uber.16 Singh further contended that, even if a valid agreement did exist, Singh
would not be bound to the arbitration provision of the contract because Uber failed to
meet its burden to show that the provision was a constitutional waiver of the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial, the provision is excluded under the residual clause of
section one of the FAA, the provision violated multiple state and federal laws, and the
provision was unconscionable.17 Singh additionally claimed that the agreement with Uber
is within the residual clause of section one of the FAA.18 With respect to Singh’s second
contention regarding the residual clause and why he should not be bound by the
arbitration provision, Singh stated the necessity for discovery on the essential section one
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residual clause inquiry, as discovery would allow Singh to prove he was engaged in
interstate commerce.19
Uber asked the district court to reject Singh’s claim on the grounds that the
residual clause only applies to workers who transport goods, not passengers.20 The
district court granted Uber’s motion to dismiss and compel arbitration.21 However, the
district court did not reach the “engaged-in-interstate commerce” inquiry.22 The district
court ruled that Singh did not fall within the ambit of the residual clause of section one,
holding that the clause only extends to “transportation workers who transport goods, not
those who transport passengers.”23 Therefore, the district court ruled that the arbitrator
would decide the remaining questions not answered during the district court’s original
ruling.24
Third Circuit’s Analysis
The Third Circuit disagreed with the district court and relied on precedent, which
stated that section one of the FAA may extend to classes of transportation workers who
transport passengers, so long as they are engaged in, or work closely related to, interstate
commerce. 25 The Third Circuit remanded the decision back to the district court for
further proceedings consistent with the Third Circuit’s interpretation.26
Before any case involving arbitration can move forward, the court must decide the
threshold issue of if the arbitrator has the power to decide to hear the claim.27 Arbitration
agreements are equal with all other contracts, and should be enforced according to their
terms agreed on by the parties.28 When the FAA is controlling in arbitration disputes,
parties are free to include a delegation clause to the contract that allows the arbitrator to
III.
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decide arbitrability.29 However, since Singh contended that the FAA is not controlling
based on section one of the FAA, the Third Circuit relied on New Prime, Inc. v. Olivera,
which was decided by the Supreme Court during the pendency of this appeal.30 New
Prime stated that courts should be the ones to determine whether an agreement is
excluded from FAA coverage, even where the parties have agreed to a delegation clause,
like Singh and Uber have in this case.31 The Third Circuit decided that the district court
should properly determine whether the arbitration agreement is valid.32
With the court using the precedent in New Prime to rule that the Third Circuit is
responsible for deciding if the arbitration agreement is exempt under section one of the
FAA, the Third Circuit next decided if Singh had put forth enough evidence to warrant
discovery on Singh’s contention that the provision was excluded under the residual clause
of section one of the FAA.33 The Third Circuit laid out the applicable standard of review
under which motions to compel arbitration could be decided.34 As described in Guidotti
v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, LLC., the two possible standards are the motion to
dismiss standard, or the summary judgment standard.35 The motion to dismiss standard
applies when a party’s claims are “subject to an enforceable arbitration clause,” meaning
the complaint and incorporated documents support a valid agreement to arbitrate on their
face.36 The summary judgment standard, however, is used when “the complaint and its
supporting documents are unclear” as to whether the parties agreed to arbitrate, or the
plaintiff has responded with “additional facts sufficient to place the agreement in
dispute,” requiring a “restricted inquiry” into the additional facts.37 The Third Circuit
articulated a balancing test, juxtaposing the efficiency and speed fostered by the FAA,
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with the need for clarity of an ambiguous argument.38 Since the Third Circuit determined
this to be an agreement that needed clarity, the court used the summary judgment
standard and allowed for a “restricted inquiry” in an attempt to clarify whether the FAA
controlled.39
Substantively, the court decided the question of whether the section one residual
clause applies, and the FAA is not controlling, could be determined by answering two
questions: first, whether section one applies to transportation workers who transport
passengers; and, second, whether Singh belongs to a class of workers that are engaged in
interstate commerce.40 The Third Circuit had previously ruled that the residual clause
only includes those other classes of workers "who are actually engaged in the movement
of interstate or foreign commerce or in work so closely related thereto as to be in
practical effect part of it."41 The court also relied on precedent from a pair of cases
involving the Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, a bus company where the employees
transported passengers.42 In both cases, the Third Circuit ruled that the workers of the bus
line employees qualified as employment of a class of workers engaged in interstate
commerce.43 The court saw these decisions confirmed in later Supreme Court decisions.44
Consequently, the court denied Uber’s assertions that section one of the FAA refers only
to workers who transport goods, not to workers who transport people.45 The court ruled
that section one applied to transportation workers who transport passengers.46
Next, the court decided whether Singh belonged to a class of workers that are
engaged in interstate commerce.47 This was a matter of first impression in the Third
38
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Circuit because the district court did not rule on this issue in its original ruling, so the
Court of Appeals remanded the case back to the district court.48 The Third Circuit ruled
that the summary judgment standard should apply following discovery to clarify the
arbitration provision and the related incorporated documents.49
IV.

Significance
The Third Circuit overturning the district court in Singh under section one of the
FAA is important to the future of arbitration. This decision will likely provide a solid
precedent for other parties hoping to avoid arbitration. In addition, the Third Circuit may
have limited the scope of the FAA as the governing document over arbitration
agreements due to the expansive reading of the Commerce Clause. Finally, the Supreme
Court may grant certiorari to decide Singh, especially in light of other recently decided
cases, to address the issue of what classes of workers are exempt from the FAA.
First, the issue of transportation workers being able to fight mandatory arbitration
has been a contentious issue for transportation unions.50 Mandatory arbitration
agreements are commonplace among independent contractors.51 However, the largest
truck driver union, the Teamsters, has fought for their unionized drivers to be classified
as employees, and thus exempted from mandatory arbitration.52 This was the driving
issue that allowed the Court to decide New Prime.53 New Prime involved a dispute
between an interstate shipping company and workers who were classified as independent
contractors, in which the Court ruled that companies could not circumvent federal law by
classifying employees as independent contractors.54 New Prime marks a shift towards
further exemptions for those in the transportation industry.55 Singh also follows the ruling
in New Prime by expanding the coverage of section one of the FAA to independent
48
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contractors.56 This is a trend that more states are following, in which they close loopholes
in employment law by not allowing companies to classify employees as independent
contractors to avoid paying benefits that come along with employee status.57
Second, there are currently two cases that will be tried in the New Jersey Supreme
Court involving exemption from FAA due to the residual clause of section one.58 The
first case involves truck drivers who deliver certain pharmaceuticals who are being forced
to arbitrate their employment contract.59 The second claim involves a different delivery
company’s driver who is contesting whether his profession is covered under section one
of the FAA because he is engaged in interstate commerce.60 It is likely that the decision
in Singh will give more credence to the plaintiffs’ claims in the aforementioned cases,
which are attempting to prove they are engaged in interstate commerce.61 The New Jersey
Supreme Court could use the decision in Singh to justify a more expansive definition of
interstate commerce, and rule that the two separate plaintiffs are both engaged in
interstate commerce.
Singh is a step towards an expansion of exemptions for the FAA.62 One point
relied on by Uber was the dicta in Supreme Court case Circuit City v. Adams.63 Uber’s
argument stated that if Congress wanted to expand the definition of the exemption,
Congress would enact special legislation in order to accomplish this result.64 The decision
in Singh does not require Congress to enact new legislation to protect certain classes of
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employees.65 Instead, the interpretation of which employees are exempt under section one
is now left to the courts to determine.66 It would not be surprising to see cases decided in
the future from circuits that have been less friendly to arbitration using section one as
justification to limit adhesive arbitration agreements.
Finally, the Supreme Court has the option of reviewing the decision by the Third
Circuit. The Supreme Court has shaped the field of arbitration since the introduction of
the FAA.67 There have never been clearer lines about what areas the FAA preempts and
what areas are governed by state law.68 Whether workers who transport passengers, the
issue in Singh, are expempted from the FAA would be well suited for a decision by the
Supreme Court.69 The Court could either uphold the Third Circuit’s definition and
explicitly rule that employees that transport passengers are exempt under section one of
the FAA, or the Court could take a more traditional approach and narrow the exemption
under section one to only include those individuals who are directly involved in interstate
commerce.70 While ruling this way may be slightly less consistent with the textual
reading of the FAA, it would be much more consistent with the liberal federal policy of
enforcing arbitration agreements.”71 Either way, clarification would be helpful for
employees and businesses alike.
If Uber chooses to appeal, it is possible that the Supreme Court will choose not to
grant certiorari to Singh. The Supreme Court grants certiorari as a matter of judicial
discretion, based on a number of factors.72 However, by failing to review Singh, and
under the new ruling of New Prime, it would be lower courts that are deciding if an
arbitration agreement is exempt from being enforced under section one.73 States who
have traditionally viewed as opposing mandatory arbitration may be likely to use this
new exemption to invalidate arbitration agreements that would otherwise be
65
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enforceable.74 The Supreme Court allowing this result would be atypical, as it is contrary
to Supreme Court holdings prohibiting states from passing laws that are discriminatory to
arbitration.75
V.

Critique
Singh was decided using Third Circuit precedent, but the case may have
consequences that directly contrast with the Supreme Court’s liberal policy favoring
arbitration. The Supreme Court has granted immense deference to Congress concerning
issues of interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause.76 In doing so, the definition
of what constitutes interstate commerce now includes almost all commerce.77 Based on
the holding in Singh, this result could lead to a new wave of challenges to arbitration
agreements under section one of the FAA.78
With the definition of commerce encompassing most industries, the Supreme
Court has awarded Congress a great deal of oversight in regulating commerce among the
states.79 At the same time, the Supreme Court has also extended federal preemption in
arbitration which has led to the FAA is the controlling on almost all arbitration
agreements.80 Both the expansion of the Commerce Clause and the FAA both come from
the same basic idea that the federal government has an interest in increasing efficiency in
both commerce and the adjudicatory process, and cannot have anything hampering the
growth of these two important fields.81 However, because of the wording in section one
of the FAA, the exemption of employees who are involved in interstate commerce
expands as the definition of what is considered related to interstate commerce expands.82
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The more businesses and related activity is considered interstate commerce, the larger the
class of employees are that are considered exempt from the FAA under section one.83 If
the exemption is so large that it covers all classes of workers in transportation, including
those who are tangentially related to the transport of interstate commerce, the FAA
effectively becomes less effective in a governing employment contracts.
Congress and the courts have a legitimate interest in allowing employees to
arbitrate their grievances.84 Arbitration is speedier and more efficient, can be less costly,
and allows greater access for justice to the less wealthy.85 Furthermore, courts would like
to avoid opportunistic attempts at forum shopping.86 If plaintiff attorneys feel they would
fare better in court, the attorney can easily claim their client is a worker exempted from
the FAA under section one. As such, if the exemption under section one is widely
applied, arbitration agreements are in danger of becoming more of a formality, rather
than an enforceable agreement.
VI.

Conclusion
Singh is a favorable outcome for plaintiffs in the transportation industry that are
attempting to limit class action lawsuit waivers. Class action waivers have become
frequent in employment contracts that contain arbitration agreements.87 Since the Court
has attempted to apply arbitration agreements as they are written and agreed to by parties,
exemptions and exceptions were generally limited. Singh gives the plaintiffs precedent
for employees that are directly involved in interstate commerce to avoid mandatory
arbitration. The Supreme Court would have a good reason to examine a case of this
nature in greater detail to provide clarification to which class of workers is exempt under
section one.
However, Singh also textually upholds the FAA by correctly determining the class
of workers that were meant to be exempt from the document.88 Increases in technology
have led to commerce being even more prevalent today.89 The shipping sector of the
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economy is one of the largest in the country. According to the Department of
Transportation, over 13,000,000 workers are employed in the transportation and
warehouse sector.90 Such a large class of workers being exempt from the FAA is counter
to the Supreme Court’s attempt to provide a uniform standard for all parties during
arbitration disputes. This case is perhaps an opportunity for the Supreme Court to
reexamine the FAA, and update it to meet the requirements of the modern day.
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